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Abstract The paper analyzes the pervasiveness of family board memberships 
within family business groups (FBGs), which are large and diversified form of 
family businesses dominant in emerging economies. The data pertain to 2017 
and include board information on 640 firms affiliated to the largest 26 FBGs in 
Turkey. The study cluster analyzes the FBGs according to family involvement in 
their governance. Derived from different theoretical lenses, it also aims to 
identify the variables that condition different clusters. Results show that several 
decades after liberalization, families still control the groups pervasively though 
with varying degrees. Regarding the extent of family involvement in 
governance, different clusters are identified as tight control, vertical control, 
and loose control. Ownership structure emerges as the main antecedent that 
differentiates FBGs in different clusters. 
 
 
















Participación familiar en la gobernanza de grupos empresariales familiares 
Este trabajo analiza la presencia de los miembros de la junta familiar dentro de 
los grupos empresariales familiares (FBG, por sus siglas en inglés), que son 
grandes y diversificadas formas de negocios familiares dominantes en las 
economías emergentes. Los datos pertenecen al año 2017 e incluyen 
información sobre 640 empresas afiliadas a los 24 Grupos de Empresas 
Familiares más importantes de Turquía. El análisis cluster realizado estudia los 
grupos de empresas familiares según la implicación de la familia en su gobierno.	
En relación a diferentes puntos de vista teóricos, también tiene como objetivo 
identificar las variables que condicionan los diferentes grupos. Los resultados 
muestran que varias décadas después de la liberalización, las familias todavía 
controlan los grupos de forma generalizada, aunque con diversos grados. Con 
respecto al grado de participación de la familia en el gobierno, se identifican 
diferentes grupos: control estricto, control vertical y control flexible. La 
estructura de propiedad emerge como el antecedente principal que diferencia 
los FBG en diferentes los diferentes clusters.  
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Family businesses are important economic actors 
in both developed and developing countries 
(Schulze & Gedajlovic, 2010). Family business 
literature has traditionally focused on developed 
country family firms which are mostly stand-
alone companies. However, family businesses are 
important also in emerging countries. Family 
business groups (FBGs), a particular form of 
family business, are dominant organizational 
forms in many emerging economies (Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001). Korean chaebols, Indian business 
houses, Latin American grupos economicos, 
Taiwanese guanxi, and Turkish holding 
companies are archetypal examples of this form 
(Guillen, 2000). 
A business group is defined as “collections of 
legally independent firms, operating in multiple 
(often unrelated) industries, which are bound 
together by persistent formal (e.g. equity) and 
informal (e.g. family) ties’ (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007, 
p. 331). It differs from an American conglomerate 
whose subsidiaries act as autonomous units and 
lack inter-firm ties.  In a business group structure, 
inter-firm ties is more stable than those in 
conglomerates (Davis, Diekman, & Tinsley, 1994) 
and affiliate firms operate in a substantial degree 
of interdependence due to a social structure such 
as a family (Granovetter, 1995). A prevalent 
variant of business groups are FBGs, which are 
characterized by large size, unrelated 
diversification,  and family control in their 
ownership and governance (Fracchia, Mesquita, & 
Quiroga, 2010).  There have been significant 
changes in economic and institutional environments 
of emerging countries due to financial crises, 
deregulation, and market-oriented policies in the 
last decades (Chung & Mahmood; Fracchia et al., 
2010; Waillerdsak & Suehiro, 2010). However, FBGs 
as an organizational form have been resilient and 
they continue to be important for their countries’ 
economies.  For example, leading multinational 
firms of Korea such as Samsung, LG or Hyundai are 
FBGs.  In most Latin American economies, majority 
of the large listed firms are affiliated to an FBG 
(Lefort, 2010).  In India FBGs are dominant in 
corporate-sector activity while in Taiwan a 
significant percentage of the total labor force is 
employed by FBGs (Chung & Mahmood, 2010; 
Sarkar, 2010). 
Research on business groups for the most part 
have been comparative in nature, focusing on 
performance outcomes of group affiliates vis-a-
vis stand-alone companies most of which are 
small and medium-sized family businesses in the 
same context (e.g. Garg & Delios, 2007; Kim, 
Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010).  However, family 
dimension has largely been missing in research 
on FBGs (Selekler-Göksen & Yildirim-Öktem, 
2017).  Studies on corporate governance of 
business groups have mostly been confined to the 
changes in their governance structures as a 
response to institutional changes in their 
environments (e.g. Selekler-Göksen & Yildirim-
Öktem, 2009; Tsui-Auch & Lee, 2003). While 
there seems to be a consensus on the resilience 
of family rule in FBGs, there is scant research on 
different configurations of owner-family 
involvement in governance of such a large and 
diversified organizational form.   This study aims 
to fill this gap by clustering FBGs with respect to 
family’s presence in governance at business 
group and affiliate-firm levels. It also aims to 
identify the antecedents that condition different 
types of family involvement among FBGs in the 
same context.  
The paper is structured as follows: The next 
section discusses the theoretical background and 
reviews the literature on family involvement in 
governance structure of FBGs. The third section 
provides information on the research context, 
followed by the description of research 
methodolody. The penultimate section presents 
the findings and the final section concludes. 
Literature Review and Theoretical 
Background 
FBGs are larger and more diversified (through 
legally separate firms) than stand-alone family 
firms that are typically small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs).  They could grow rapidly 
thanks to state support, protection from 
international competition, and the opportunity 
to benefit from the groups’ pooled financial and 
human resources. FBGs of many economies such 
as South Korean chaebol, Indian business houses 
or Latin American grupos have a hierarchical 
structure with a “mother company” or a “holding 
company” at the apex of the group.  The holding 
company has a board of directors and an 
administrative center that serves as the 
headquarters of the group. It crafts group-level 
strategies such as overseas expansion or large-
scale investments, and it also monitors and 
coordinates activities of the member firms 
(Chang & Shin, 2006; Fracchia et al., 2010; Kim, 
2010).  Headed by a CEO, the administrative 
center has sectoral and staff departments (such 
as finance, HR, and legal affairs) that serve the 
whole group. Member firms of the FBGs are 
legally separate entities and have their own 
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boards and managers, but they are subject to the 
financial and strategic control of the group 
(Colpan, 2010; Lefort, 2010; Yildirim-Öktem, 
2010). These affiliated firms may be wholly-
owned by the family or the holding company, be 
publicly listed or may form joint ventures with 
other (foreign or domestic) companies (Yildirim-
Öktem & Üsdiken, 2010).  
Governance of FBGs is characterized by family 
dominance in their ownership and management 
(Sarkar, 2010). Owner-families maintain control 
over the group through centralized governance, 
and social integration based on family ties 
(Granovetter, 1995).  Despite the large and 
diversified characteristic of the group form, 
families maintain control by keeping key 
managerial positions in the holding company, 
having multiple directorates in affiliate-firms, 
grooming sons and daughters to succeed the 
founding patriarchs, and through cross-
shareholdings among group affiliates (Kim, 2010; 
Wailerdsak & Suehiro, 2010).  Additionally, FBGs 
are characterized by pyramidal ownership 
structures that enable families to control firms in 
which they have minority stakes through their 
majority ownership in the holding companies and 
investment companies that are ultimate owners 
of group affiliates (Chung & Mahmood, 2010; 
Lefort, 2010; Sarkar, 2010).   
In South Korean chaebol, families have complete 
control over the group (Kim, 2010).  Decision-
making is not based on consensus. The patriarch 
or the family leader has the greatest power. 
Together with his heirs, the patriarch rules the 
group in an autocratic way (Biggart, 1990).  
Interlocking directorates within the group is not 
common. Instead, family members hold multiple 
directorships in flagship companies while they 
use non-family managers for other member 
companies that are not of strategic importance 
to the group (Orru, Biggart, & Hamilton, 1991).  
In Indian FBGs, family members are involved in 
decision-making bodies of the group 
headquarters and the boards of affiliates, in 
which they have ownership control through 
direct and indirect equity stakes (Sarkar, 2010). 
In Taiwanese FBGs, unlike the ones in Korea and 
India, an administrative center is not involved in 
the planning and monitoring of the group (Chung 
& Mahmood, 2010).  It is the family leader and a 
small number of selected managers (so called 
the “inner circle”) that have the greatest 
decision-making power (Thompson, 1967).  Most 
of the inner circle managers are family members 
or former friends and colleagues that have built 
mutual trust with the family leader (Luo & 
Chung, 2005). Also in Latin American grupos, 
families are actively involved in the governance 
of the group. In Argentinian and Mexican FBGs, 
for example, several generations govern the FBG 
by possessing majority of the seats on the board 
of the business group, and through multiple 
directorships within the group (Fracchia et al., 
2010; Hoshino, 2010).  
Despite the preference of the family to have a 
tight control over the group, there are limits to 
family’s involvement in governance of FBGs.  
Both internal exigencies and external pressures 
may account for the need to involve non-family 
executives in the family business. Internal 
pressures may emerge from organization’s size, 
extent of diversification, and family complexity. 
External pressures, on the other hand, may 
include changes in the institutional environment 
towards a more liberal and international market 
economy accompanied by institutional reforms to 
improve corporate governance of firms.    
From a contingency perspective, internal 
complexity and environmental complexity 
necessitate more professionalized governance 
because of the need for wider range of 
capabilities to deal with these complexities 
(Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, & Dennis, 2000; 
Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004). Internal 
complexity is associated with firm size as 
managing a larger volume is likely to exceed 
information-processing capacity of the family 
and cause delays in decision-making (Fiegener et 
al., 2000).    Environmental complexity, on the 
other hand, may be linked with firm’s 
diversification strategy as management of 
unrelated businesses may lead to monitoring 
problem, require a wider knowledge base, and a 
more complex decision-making especially in 
areas such as resource allocation (Vieregger, 
Larson, & Anderson, 2017). Given the natural 
limits to family size, capacity, and expertise, 
both size of the group and the ranges of 
busineses in which the group operates are likely 
to restrain the involvement of the family in the 
business and call for professionalization 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Infact, families 
cannot exercise tight control once the group gets 
large and diversified (e.g. Wailerdsak & Suehiro, 
2010). 
Family complexity, which is linked with family 
size and generational issues  (Voordeckers, Gils, 
& den Heuvel, 2007) as well as involvement of 
multiple families in the case of FBGs may also 
affect the involvement of family members in the 
governance of the group. When number of family 
members and the stakes are high, the family may 
need the involvement of outsiders to resolve the 
conflicts (Voordeckers et al., 2007).   In the case 
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of FBGs, even when multiple generations and 
multiple families are involved, ownership usually 
continues to be concentrated in the hands of the 
elder family members. Thus, the family is 
unlikely to leave away the key managerial 
positions in the group. Additionally, with the 
involvement of multiple families and/or different 
branches of the extended family in the business, 
power issues are likely to emerge. This may lead 
to an increase in the representation of family 
members in the governance of the group in order 
to have a power balance among the owner-
families and/or different branches of the family. 
From an institutional theory perspective, the 
way corporations are governed is likely to be 
influenced by their legal and social contexts  
(Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008).  
Thus, board composition may not be a response 
to internal and external complexities, but to 
regulatory and normative influences.  
Organizations try to obtain legitimacy by 
conforming to external formal or informal 
expectations (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). 
However, conformity to institutional 
prescriptions  is likely to remain more in 
appearance than in substance (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Young et al., 2008).  Late-industrializing 
countries have been undergoing policy and 
institutional changes for liberalizing and 
internationalizing their economies. Particularly 
after the 1997 financial crises, East Asian 
governments became aware of the importance of 
internationalization for fueling economic growth. 
They lifted restrictions for entry of foreign 
capital in their countries (Chung & Mahmood, 
2010; Waillerdsak & Suehiro, 2010).  With the 
increase in public and foreign ownership, FBGs 
had to respond to the demands of these new 
actors by being more transparent and 
accountable.  This was supported by 
supranational organizations such as the OECD, 
IMF and World Bank that encouraged national 
governments to adopt codes of best practice and 
establish necessary institutions to monitor 
compliance at the firm level (Chang, 2006).  
Common recommendations of the governance 
reports had a particular emhasis on board 
structures, promoting an increase in independent 
directors to protect the rights of minority 
shareholders.  However, corporate governance 
mechanisms in Anglo-Saxon countries had little 
institutional support in emerging countries where 
formal institutions such as laws and regulations 
regarding information disclosure and securities 
trading are absent or weak (Peng, 2004). In 
emerging economies, informal mechanisms such 
as concentrated ownership, family control and 
familial connections emerge as a substitute for 
the missing formal institutions (Estrin & 
Prevezer, 2011; Young, 2008).  Pressures for the 
adoption of Anglo-Saxon governance practices 
was perceived as a threat by owner-families who 
are used to exert a tight control over the group. 
As the codes of best practice were not 
internalized by the owner-families who gained 
power in the existing governance structure, their 
implementation remained at the surface (Tsui-
Auch, 2003).  The families strategically 
responded to such pressures; by adhering to the 
codes in more regulated sectors and decreasing 
the ratio of family members in the boards of the 
affiliates which are quoted on the stock 
exchange (Selekler-Gökşen & Yildirim-Öktem, 
2009; Yildirim-Öktem & Üsdiken,2010). This 
decrease in the ratio of family members, 
however, was not offset by outsiers, but by the 
trusted current/retired managers in the closest 
circle of the family (Üsdiken, Yildirim-Öktem, & 
Senol, 2015). 
These trusted non-family executives are mostly 
the ones with high group-specific experience and 
expertise (Üsdiken et al., 2015). The expertise of 
elder generation family members are mostly 
limited to the historically core sectors around 
which the group has grown and the social capital 
of the family is mostly locally embedded. 
Therefore, in new sectors of the group and in 
international markets, the family is in a way 
forced to share control with non-family 
executives who can fill this gap and also help to 
transfer this knowhow to new generation family 
members. Thus, among different dimensions of 
power (Finkelstein, 1992), expertise power is 
potentially a challenging ground for family 
members and a relatively more contested terrain 
than ownership and structural power (Yildirim-
Öktem, 2010).  Ownership power remains with 
the family as public share in holding companies 
or their affiliates has been very limited (Fracchia 
et al., 2010; Yildirim-Öktem&Üsdiken, 2010). 
This is partly due to the underdeveloped stock 
markets in emerging economies and the ability of 
the business groups to easily finance their 
affiliates through their internal capital markets 
as well as to the families’ tendency not to share 
the ownership control with unfamiliar actors. 
When they need funding from outside, they may 
control the public-listing companies through the 
pyramidal ownership structure. Structural power, 
on the other hand, is the hierarchical power 
(Hambrick, 1981) and can be captured by one’s 
formal positions or titles within the organization 
(Finkelstein, 1992).  In FBGs, the family typically 
has more structural power than non-kin 
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executives because it occupies key positions 
within the group; board membership in the 
holding company and multiple directorships in 
the boards of affiliate firms (Lefort, 2010; 
Yildirim-Öktem, 2010).   
Based on the discussions on institutional theory, 
FBGs in different clusters with respect to family 
involvement may be expected to differ in terms 
of their public ownership and ratio of publicly 
quoted affiliates.  This is because companies 
with public ownership are more visible and have 
been under more pressure to conform to the 
principles of good corporate governance. 
However, potentially challenged by other 
dimensions of power such as expertise and 
prestige power, the family would not be willing 
to share its ownership and structural power and 
thus would pervasively keep key positions within 
the group.   
The paper clusters FBGs in the same context with 
respect to the extent of family’s involvement in 
the holding company board, affiliate boards, and 
the family leader’s presence in affiliate boards.  
In line with the theoretical background and the 
literature reviewed above, family members are 
expected to have board memberships on the 
holding company and multiple directorships on 
affiliate firm boards to a large degree.  However, 
the way families are involved in the governance 
of FBGs may differ according to FBG 
characteristics such as size and diversification, 
ownership characteristics, and family 
characteristics such as generation in power, 
number of owning families and family members 
involved in the business.  
Research Context 
Turkish FBGs provided the setting of this study. 
In the business group literature, Turkish FBGs 
(“family holdings”) are considered as an 
archetypal example of large and diversified FBGs 
(Guillen, 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Turkish 
FBGs have a hierarchical structure with a holding 
company, which does not only hold shares in 
affiliate firms but also serves as the 
administrative center of the group (Bugra, 1994). 
FBGs are the dominant organizational forms in 
Turkish economy. The majority of listed 
companies in Turkey are in the form of family-
controlled company groups (OECD, 2017) and 
FBG affiliates account for half of the top 100 
corporate firms (ISO, 2016).   
Turkey opened up its economy through a process 
of liberalization starting from the early 1980s 
following a long period of state-dependent, 
import substitution industrialization (Önis, 2011; 
Young et al., 2008). Transition of the country to 
a more liberalized economy has not had a 
negative impact neither on the population of 
FBGs nor on the size of the preexisting ones 
(Bugra, 1994; Colpan, 2010).  Both foreign and 
public ownership in FBG affiliates have remained 
small in Turkey (Yildirim-Öktem & Üsdiken, 
2010). In 2000s, the transition has been 
accompanied by national and international 
pressures to improve corporate governance, 
though leading to insignificant effects on major 
governance characteristics of FBGs; family 
control in management and ownership. Family 
presence on boards of FBG affiliated firm has not 
decreased significanty as in the absence of 
coercive pressure, familiesresponded to 
corporate governance reforms through avoidance 
and manipulation strategies (Selekler-Göksen & 
Yildirim-Öktem, 2009). The family leaders 
continued to occupy the chair position in the 
holding company boards (Yildirim-Öktem & 
Üsdiken, 2010).   Despite the relative increase in 
the number of professional managers and 
outsiders on the boards of FBG affiliates 
(Selekler-Göksen & Yildirim-Öktem, 2009), 
families and their trusted circle continue to keep 
the key positions and the majority of the board 
memberships (Üsdiken et al., 2015). 
Methodology 
Sample and data collection 
A multi-stage process was applied to establish 
the sample.  First, a population of Turkish BGs 
was identified by using two sources; the website 
of Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) and the list of 
top 500 largest firms published by Istanbul 
Chamber of Industry (ISO, 2016).  Second, BGs 
with more than 10 affiliates operating in at least 
5 industries according to United Nation’s 2-digit 
International Standard Industrial Coding (ISIC, 
version 3.1) were chosen. There were 28 BGs 
that met this criterion.  Finally, those that were 
not family-owned-and-contolled were 
eliminated, leading to the elimination of two 
BGs. Thus, the final sample is composed of 26 
largest Turkish FBGs based on the above criteria.  
A summary of sample characteristics are 
provided in Table 1. FBGs in the sample are the 
largest ones in the research context. They all 
meet the sampling criteria of having a minumum 
of 10 member-firms operating in at least five 
industries. The table also provides information 
on the primary industry of each FBG. It is defined 
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as the industry in which the highest percentage 
of member-firms operates according to 1-digit 
ISIC. As can be seen from the table, each FBG in 
the sample is dominantly owned by a family or 
multiple families. The chair of the holding 
company board is invariably a family leader that 
comes from first, second or third generation. In 
most cases, the board of the holding company is 
dominated by family members.  
Lists of firms affiliated to the 26 FBGs were 
reached from their annual reports and web sites. 
In order to include only the first-tier-companies, 
subsidiaries of the affiliated firms were 
eliminated. Non-profit firms and those establised 
abroad were also excluded from the study.  A 
total of 673 main firms affiliated to 26 FBGs 
were identified.  Among them, 33 of them were 
eliminated as information on their board of 
directors could not be reached. Finally, 640 
affiliated fims were included in the study. For 
publicly quoted firms, board data were obtained 
from the database of Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(ISE). For firms that were not held by the public, 
websites of Istanbul Chamber of Industry and 
Turkish Trade Registry Gazette were used. 
 
Table 1: Family characteristics of the FBGs in the sample 
FBG  


















sectors primary industry 
1 75,00% 1 1 1 89,28% 14 10 Financial intermediation 
2 55,56% 1 2 1 100,00% 15 10 Manufacturing 
3 50,00% 1 2 2 69,28% 18 6 Construction 
4 54,55% 1 2 2 100% 25 12 Wholesale and retail trade 
5 100,00% 1 3 1 100% 19 8 Transport and storage 
6 42,86% 1 2 1 100% 19 10 Manufacturing 
7 40,00% 1 1 1 100% 19 10 Manufacturing 
8 44,44% 1 2 1 63,73% 58 16 Comunity, social, and 
personal service activities 
9 7,69% 1 2 1 95,21% 132 17 Hotels and restaurants 
10 28,57% 1 2 1 100% 20 12 Manufacturing 
11 20,00% 1 2 2 87,50% 12 8 Construction 
12 33,33% 1 1 1 100,00% 15 8 Real estate 
13 42,86% 1 2 1 100,00% 20 6 Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
14 60,00% 1 2 1 100,00% 11 9 Manufacturing 
15 40,00% 1 2 1 100,00% 11 10 Manufacturing 
16 57,14% 1 2 1 100,00% 16 13 Manufacturing 
17 33,33% 1 3 1 81,76% 47 22 Manufacturing 
18 70,00% 1 1 1 100% 18 12 Manufacturing 
19 55,56% 1 3 1 35,36% 24 18 Manufacturing 
20 100,00% 1 2 1 100 % 11 11 Manufacturing 
21 36,36% 1 2 3 51,71% 16 12 Construction 
22 50,00% 1 2 1 100% 13 10 Manufacturing 
23 50,00% 1 2 1 100% 20 9 Manufacturing 
24 100,00% 1 1 1 100% 44 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 
25 80,00% 1 2 1 100% 12 7 Manufacturing 
26 66,67% 1 1 1 100% 11 7 Construction 
 
 
Variables and measures 
Family involvement in the governance of FBGs was 
assessed by three different variables. The first one 
was the ratio of family members on the holding 
company board. It was calculated by dividing the 
number of seats held by extended family members 
by the total number of seats at the holding 
company board. The other two varaibles were at 
the affiliate-firm level and probed the family 
dominance at the affiliate-firm boards. Family ratio 
at the affiliates was measured by the average ratio 
of extended family members on the boards of 
affiliates. Family leader ratio, on the other hand, 
was calculated by the number of affiliate firms in 
which family leader held a board position divided 
by total number of affililiated firms within an FBG. 
FBGs in the sample were cluster analyzed in order 
to identify different levels of family involvement in 
their governance structures. The cluster analysis 
was based on the three aforementioned variables 
related to family involvement in boards at both 
group and affiliate-firm levels.  For cluster analysis, 
K-means procedure was used. As four-cluster 
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solution yielded a cluster with only three FBGs, 
three-cluster solution was used in conducting a 
comparative analysis. Three clusters of FBGs with 
different levels of family involvement were 
compared along five BG and family characteristics; 
a) size of the FBG, b) extent of diversification, c) 
ownership structure, d) percentage of quoted 
affiliates e) size of the family, f) number of 
generations. Size of the group and extent of 
unrelated diversification were used as indicators of 
internal complexity. Size of the FBG was measured 
by number of affiliated firms and total number of 
full-time employees within the group.  Extent of 
diversification was measured as the number of 
industries in which the FBG operates according to 
United Nations’ UN's 2-digit ISIC. Ownership 
structure of the holding company was assessed by 
two measures; family share and public share in the 
ownership structure. Percentage of quoted 
affiliates was calculated as the number affiliates 
that were publicly listed divided by the total 
number of affiliates.  Three variables were used to 
capture family complexity; family size, generation 
in power, and number of owning families. Family 
size involved in the business was measured by 
number of family members who have at least one 
board membership in one of the affiliates or in the 
holding company. Generation in power was 
measured as the generation of the family member 
who was the president of the holding company 
board. Number of owner-families was measured as 
the number of families that have an at least 10% 
share in the ownership structure of the group. All 
the data pertain to 2017. Given the small sample 
size, the non-parametric Mann Whitney-U and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests were employed to compare 
different clusters. 
Findings 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of 
the variables in the study. FBGs in the sample 
display a family-centric governance structure 
to varying degrees.  As can be seen from the 
table, families sustain their control mostly 
through their board memberships at the 
holding company rather than the member 
firms. This is understandable given the large 
number of affiliate companies and the 
diversity of the sectors in which they operate.  
On average, 57% of the board seats at the 
holding company are held by the extended 
family members as opposed to 29% in the 
affiliate firm boards. At the affiliate firm 
level, families seem to sustain their control 
through family leaders’ chairmanship on the 
affiliate firm boards. Family leaders, on 
average, hold board membership at 43% of the 
affiliates and in most of them they hold the 
chairman position. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (n=26)    
Measures Mean Standard Deviation Range 
Family involvement in governance 
   Family on the affiliate boards ,29 ,23 0,00-0,84 
   Family leader on the affiliate board  ,43 ,35 ,00-1 
   Famiy on the holding company board ,57 ,24 ,08-1 
Family business group characteristics 
   Size    
     Number of affiliates 24,62 24,83 11-132 
     Number of employees 21333,15 22194,46 1003-95456 
     Number of sectors 11,23 4,12 6-22 
   Ownership    
     Percentage of family share ,91 ,17 ,35-1 
     Public ownership ,09 ,17 0-.65 
     Percentage of quoted affiliates ,13 ,14 0-,46 
   Family complexity    
     Number of owning families 1,36 ,67 1-3 
     Generation in power 1,88 ,59 1-3 
     Size of the family 4,5 2,45 1-12 
 
 
FBGs in the sample are by definition large as 
having a minimum of 10 affiliates was the 
criteria to be involved in the sample.  However, 
there is quite a variation in the size of the groups 
both in terms of number of affiliates and number 
of employees. Average number of affiliates are 
24,62 with a maximum of 132 affiliates in one 
group. Descriptive statistics also show that 
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Turkish FBGs are very diversified operating in an 
average of 11.23 sectors according to 2-digit 
ISIC.  Despite their large size, concentration of 
family ownership in groups is very high with an 
average of 91%.  Percentage of public ownership 
in the holding company, and percentage of 
publicly quoted affiliates, on the other hand, are 
still very low.  
Most of the largest groups are owned by one 
family though there are also groups that are 
owned by two or three families. In most of the 
FBGs, group chairman is a second-generation 
family member.  Given that the FBGs were 
born and grown in a late-industrializing 
economy, their young age is understandable.  
On average number of family members 
involved in the family business is quite low. 
One reason may be the small family size. 
Additionally, in some of the FBGs involvement 
of family members are limited to male family 
members due to the conservative culture in 
the research context.  Another reason may be 
the way involvement is operationalized in this 
study.  Only those family members who had 
board memberships within the FBG were 
counted.  However, there are also family 
members, particulary from third generation, 
that work in the administrative center of the 
holding company, but do not have a board m	
membership yet. Due to the incompleteness of 
data for the admistrative center of the FBGs 
and managerial positions of the member-firms, 
they were not included.   
Table 3 reveals the results of the cluster 
analysis.  Three clusters are different from each 
other in terms of the way the group is governed. 
FBGs in cluster 1 are tightly controlled by the 
family, particularly the family leader who on 
average holds a board membership in 79% of the 
affiliates. In FBGs in cluster 1, family ratio in the 
affiliate boards is also the highest among the 
three clusters.  On the other hand, in FBGs in 
cluster 2, percentage of family members in 
affiliate boards is relatively low and percentage 
of affiliate firms on which the family leader 
holds board membership is only 7%.  However, in 
FBGs in this cluster family members occupy on 
average 78% of the board seats in the holding 
company. So, in FBGs in cluster 2, although the 
family does not hold majority of the seats in 
affiliate boards, it tries to preserve vertical 
control by dominating the holding company 
board.  Finally in cluster 3, the family has a loose 
control. Among the three clusters, in cluster 3 
percentage of family members on affiliate boards 
and the holding company board is the lowest.  
 
 













Family involvement in governance 
% of family members on affiliate boards* ,48 ,21 ,14 
% of the family leader on affiliate boards* ,79 ,07 ,20 
% of family members on the holding company 
board* 
,64 ,78 ,34 
Family business group characteristics 
Number of affiliates 19,27 15,25 33,36 
Number of employees 16380,81 27852,50 23914,82 
Number of sectors 10,45 11,50 11,91 
Percentage of family share* 100% 81% 86% 
Public ownership* 0,00% 19% 14% 
% of quoted affiliates 16% 16,26% 10% 
Number of owning families 1,09 1 1,36 
Generation in power 1,82 2 1,90 
Size of the family 4,09 7 4 




Table 3 also displays test results for Mann-
Whitley U and Kruskal-Wallis. Cluster 1 and 
cluster 3 are significantly different from each 
other along all three dimensions of family 
involvement.  Cluster 1 and cluster 2 are 
significantly different in terms of the % of family 
leader on affiliate boards while Cluster 2 and 
cluster 3 are significantly different in terms of % 
of family members on the holding company 
board.   
The table also displays whether FBGs in different 
clusters are statistically different from each 
other in terms of BG and family characteristics.  
Results indicate that FBGs in different clusters 
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are not significantly different from each other in 
terms of size, level of diversification and family 
complexity.   Ownership structure emerges as 
the only variable that conditions different levels 
of family involvement.   Cluster 1 (tight control) 
and Cluster 3 (loose control) are significantly 
different from each other in terms of ownership 
structure; family percentage and public 
percentage in the holding company ownership 
structure. Results show that extent of family 
involvement is the highest where the family has 
significantly higher ownership.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
Although FBGs are defined by their family-
centric character, they have been ignored in the 
mainstream family business literature. This 
research was conducted in an emerging economy 
that is dominated by large and diversified FBGs.  
The paper analyzes the pervasiveness of the 
family involvement in governance of such a large 
and diversified organizational form several 
decades after the liberalization process started.  
 
Results point out to the persistence of family 
rule in FBGs, giving support to the institutional 
theory perspective. In most emerging countries, 
including the reserach context of this study, 
pressures to conform to the principles of good 
corporate governance did not have a legal 
sanction, but its was in the form of “comply or 
explain”. This created a room for the owner-
families to give a strategic response to such 
pressures and changed the board structures more 
in appereance than in substance. In the absence 
of strong formal institutions to back up codes of 
best practice, informal institutions such as 
familial connections and concentrated family 
ownership seem to substitute for weak formal 
institutions. 
Cluster analysis show that the owner-families 
are still intensely involved in the governance of 
the groups though with varying degrees.  
Governance of FBGs in three clusters can be 
identified as tight control, vertical control, and 
loose control. Ownership structure emerges as 
the main variable that conditions tight family 
control versus loose family control in the 
governance of Turkish FBGs.   
When the family has full ownership power, it 
has less tendency to share its structural power 
with non-kin executives. The family uses its 
structral power to monitor the member firms by 
dominating the board of the holding company 
(vertical control) and/or to coordinate the 
activities of the member firms by holding 
multiple board memberships in affiliate firms 
(horizontal control).  The results do not support 
contingency perspective. When the family is the 
sole owner of the group, it does not withdraw 
from the governance regardless of various 
internal and external contingencies. Internal 
contingencies such as group size or family 
complexity do not seem to differentiate FBGs 
that fall into different clusters in terms of 
family involvement in boards. 
This research contributes to the literature on 
family businesses by analyzing family 
involvement in a different form of family 
business, FBGs.  The study has some limitations. 
First, it was conducted in one country with 
limited sample size. It may be replicated in 
different emerging countries and with larger 
sample sizes. Second, due to unavalability of 
data, family involvement in this study only 
includes board memberships within the FBG.  
Future research may also include or focus on 
family involvement in administrative center of 
the holding company as well as in other 
management positions of the member-firms.  
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